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The relationship between di￿erent levels of government, and their interac-
tions on the ￿nancial side, has been the subject of considerable scrutiny in
recent years. There are broadly two strands to this literature. The ￿rst ex-
amines the optimal assignment of public service provision and its ￿nancing
between di￿erent levels of government; this is the classic literature on ￿s-
cal federalism. Oates (1999) provides a survey of this literature. The ’tax
assignment problem’, and the degree to which decentralized states use in-
tergovernmental grants, tax sharing schemes, or sub-central taxes and user
charges, has been an important area of debate. A number of interesting issues
have been identi￿ed within this broad area, through studies that examine
how di￿erent levels of government deploy grants, share taxation revenues,
and react to changes in the balance between central government grants and
local revenues. For instance, a number of researchers have studied and in-
terpreted the so-called ’￿y-paper e￿ect’, whereby spending by lower levels of
government increases more markedly in response to increases to intergovern-
mental grants than in response to increases in local income (see Gramlich,
1977, Oates, 1994, Hines and Thaler, 1995). This has been further devel-
oped by studies which examine whether lower levels of governments react
di￿erently to increases and decreases in intergovernmental grants. Gramlich
(1987) suggests that such an asymmetry is present in US state and local
government behaviour, but evidence to the contrary to this ’super-￿y-paper
e￿ect’ is presented in Gamkhar and Oates (1996).
A second broad strand relates to macroeconomic management in multi-
tiered governments. This literature is rather less developed, although it has
received recent attention in the OECD (see Journard and Kongsrud, 2003),
and in academic studies (see Triesman, 2000, Rodden, 2002 and Rodden and
Wibbels, 2002). This body of work emphasises that the increasing tendency
towards decentralisation and ￿scal federalism raises the issue of how to main-
tain sustainable public ￿nances. A number of industrialised economies have
adopted ￿scal co-ordination mechanisms to address this problem, as surveyed
in Journard and Kongsrud (2003), ranging from formal sub-national ￿scal
rules (e.g. expenditure and borrowing ceilings) to informal co-ordination
mechanisms. The incentive issues which are raised by multi-tiered ￿scal au-
thorities are one key issue here. For instance, considerable attention has been
given in some countries (e.g. Germany, Italy) to the problem of ’soft bud-
1get constraints’ in lower tiers of government. Rodden (2000) highlights how
the possibility of cost-shifting can lead to expectations of budget bailouts
for the ￿scally weaker German Lander, and Bordignon (2000) demonstrates
that in Italy the decentralization of essential services (health) has led to weak
budgetary controls in the expectation of a central government bailout.
Much of the empirical evidence on the way in which sub-central govern-
ments react to changes in central government policies has focused on indi-
vidual countries, especially the US. However, the contribution of sub-central
governments to attempts by central government to adjust their overall ￿scal
stance does seem to be an important issue in many OECD countries. In
Darby et al. (2004) we show that quantitatively, sub-central tiers of govern-
ment play a signi￿cant role in overall ￿scal consolidation attempts.
In this paper we focus on a natural experiment which allows us to explore
how sub-central tiers of government react to major discretionary policy shifts
at the central level1. We construct a panel of data for the OECD economies
to focus on how central and sub-central expenditures, taxation, and intergov-
ernmental grants change in response to attempts to correct the government’s
￿scal position. These episodes of ￿scal consolidations are identi￿ed using a
methodology which has become standard in the macroeconomics literature
(Alesina and Perotti, 1995, 1997, Alesina et al., 1998). We then conduct
event analyses on the panel of data, which allow us to examine the timing
of expenditure, taxation and intergovernmental grant shifts around the peri-
ods of ￿scal consolidation, distinguishing between successful (i.e. ones that
have a signi￿cant impact on a country’s debt to GDP ratio) and unsuccessful
consolidations, which do not and show signs of being temporary. In addition
to some of the above issues regarding the interactions between central and
sub-central tiers of government, our analysis also sheds light on the extent to
which sub-central tiers of government participate in ￿scal consolidations, and
hence to macroeconomic adjustment. Finally, we focus on cuts in grants as a
series of events, rather than ￿scal consolidations, and conduct event analysis
to examine how sub-central governments react to these cuts. This allows us
to examine the extent to which sub-central governments adjust expenditures
and use their own ￿scal powers (where these are signi￿cant) to o￿set the
1Whilst it is di￿cult to analyse these issues in countries where the relationship be-
tween tiers of government has changed over time, we take account of major shifts in ￿scal
responsibility.
2cuts in grants. By grouping countries or country characteristics in our event
analysis regressions we can examine whether particular patterns of reaction
to ￿scal consolidations, or cuts in central government grants are particularly
applicable to certain individual, or groups of, countries.
Our paper highlights a number of points. First, successful ￿scal consoli-
dations at central government level bring with them similar, and sustained,
cuts in expenditure at the sub-central level. Indeed a pattern emerges for
successful consolidations in which central governments cut intergovernmental
transfers to lower tiers of government, who then cut back expenditure since
they have di￿culty in raising sub-central taxation revenues. There appears
to be little evidence for the e￿ect identi￿ed by Gramlich (1987) in the USA:
sub-central governments do not tend to react to cut-backs in grants by raising
revenues signi￿cantly.
Second, unsuccessful consolidations tend to be characterized by increased
taxation at the central level, with no fall back in intergovernmental grants
and no tendency for sub-central taxation to change. It appears that there
is a strong correlation between success in consolidating central ￿scal de￿cits
and similar actions from lower tiers of government.
Third, Alesina and Perotti (1995, 1997) identi￿ed cut-backs in capital
expenditures at central government level as a sign of an unsuccessful ￿scal
consolidation. In contrast, we ￿nd that where consolidations are successful,
sub-central tiers of government have to signi￿cantly cut back on their cap-
ital expenditures. This suggests that the burden of adjustment falls onto
lower tiers of government and that central governments worry less about the
long-term (i.e. public investment) consequences of consolidation if these de-
cisions are taken at local level. In addition, there is evidence that when faced
with cuts in intergovernmental grants during consolidations, sub-central gov-
ernments tend to maintain expenditures on wages at the expense of capital
expenditure: there seems to be a de￿nite switch towards public consumption.
This might be interpreted as a variant of the e￿ect identi￿ed by Gramlich
(1987): sub-central governments seek to defend current services as opposed
to spending on infrastructure rather than raising taxation. This could be
explained by the fact that in many of the OECD countries in our sample the
states/regions and local authorities have much more limited powers to vary
taxation than in the USA.
Fourth, our results shed some light on how sub-central governments react
to cuts in grants and thus, at least indirectly, on the ’￿y-paper e￿ect’, by
3showing that it operates in reverse. It appears that successful ￿scal consoli-
dations are characterized by cut-backs in intergovernmental grants, which are
more than matched by cut-backs in sub-central expenditures. In contrast,
periods of unsuccessful consolidation, which are characterized by increases
in central taxation and no change in intergovernmental grants show only
a small temporary reduction in sub-central expenditures. By examining in
more detail episodes where central governments cut back grants to lower tiers
of government, rather than just periods of signi￿cant ￿scal consolidation, we
￿nd that this result is robust. Not only do sub-central governments react
to a cut in grants by cutting expenditures, but remarkably those countries
with structures which are more decentralized and apparently involve greater
￿scal autonomy tend to cut expenditures by more, and seem reluctant to
raise sub-central taxes. This reverse ’￿y-paper e￿ect’ might highlight either
a low degree of e￿ective ￿scal autonomy, or a high e￿ective degree of tax
competition at sub-central level which prevents any o￿setting increase in
local taxation. This does seem to contrast with the hypothesis that more
decentralised ￿scal arrangements lead to a lower degree of macroeconomic
control (cf. Tanzi, 2001, Rodden, 2002, Rodden and Wibbels, 2002), or to a
greater degree of taxation (see Keen, 1997), with the quali￿cation that cen-
tral governments retain a degree of control through their grant allocations.
Finally, we ￿nd that the institutional arrangements in countries (the gov-
ernment type and the nature of the ￿scal arrangements) do impact at the
margin on the results, and in particular that coalition governments tend to
￿nd it more di￿cult to cut grants to sub-central governments during ￿scal
consolidations.
2 Fiscal Consolidations and Sub-Central Gov-
ernment
2.1 Scope of the Study
The data used in our study are annual and are taken primarily from the IMF’s
Government Financial Statistics (GFS), 2002 Edition, supplemented with
data from the OECD Statistical Compendium. GFS provides the only inter-
nationally comparable data on ￿scal variables disaggregated by tier of gov-
4ernment, and provides us with consistent data for ￿fteen OECD countries2,
subdividing these between three levels (central, state and local categories)
producing an unbalanced panel dataset with 336 observations over the pe-
riod 1970-99. A full description of the data is provided in Appendix 1. The
data set covers not only federal, but also unitary countries. In practice, as
we show in Darby et al. (2003, 2004) the distinction between these two cat-
egories in terms of the devolution of spending and ￿nancing arrangements is
not as clear-cut as one might think.
The data set used does have some weaknesses. An obvious one is that
little or no distinction is made between tax revenues from taxes where the
sub-central tiers control both the tax rates and/or the tax base, and revenues
from tax sharing arrangements. However, we have been able to supplement
our data with information on the tax powers of sub-central tiers (see OECD,
1999) for the majority of countries and by Jonathan Rodden at MIT in the
cases of Canada and the USA. In what follows below we use this additional
data3 in our empirical work in order to distinguish between di￿erent degrees
of ￿scal autonomy.
Another potential weakness is that, to the extent that central government
can exert in￿uence on sub-central spending patterns through directives (see
Ebel and Yilmaz, 2002), GFS will overstate the true nature of sub-central
expenditure autonomy. Nonetheless, the GFS data remain the best available
for our purposes.
2.2 Identifying Fiscal Consolidation Attempts
Previous studies of ￿scal consolidation attempts have tended to focus solely
on the general government (see Alesina and Perotti, 1995, 1997, Alesina et al.,
1998). In common with the existing literature, we de￿ne a ￿scal consolidation
as a discretionary attempt to improve general government ￿scal balances.
This of course involves abstracting from the e￿ects of automatic stabilisers
and interest payments, and focusing on the structural primary balance as
a proportion of GDP. There is no universally accepted way of decomposing
2Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, the
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the UK and the USA.
3However, we do not have this additional data for Australia and France, and so in the
analysis involving the ￿scal autonomy data we lose some sample observations.
5the primary ￿scal balance to GDP ratio into its cyclical and discretionary
components4. In what follows, we adopt the methodology used in Alesina
and Perotti (1995, 1997), and Alesina et al. (1998), who follow Blanchard
(1993) in constructing ￿scal impulses as a measure of discretionary changes
in ￿scal policy from one year to the next.
For each country in our sample, we construct the Blanchard measure of
￿scal impulses by regressing each component of the primary balance on un-
employment, a constant, and a quadratic trend. Predicted values for revenues
and transfers are calculated conditional on the previous year’s unemployment
rate, and this allows one to calculate a predicted primary balance based on
an unchanged unemployment rate. The Blanchard measure of the struc-
tural ￿scal impulse is then calculated by subtracting the predicted cyclically
adjusted primary balance from its actual value5.
Having constructed a measure of discretionary changes in ￿scal policy for
each country, there are two ways of proceeding. The ￿rst is simply to use
this measure as part of a panel dataset across countries to examine com-
mon features which characterise shifts in general discretionary ￿scal policy.
However, the problem with this approach is that the measured discretionary
￿scal impulse is unlikely to be zero even where there is no discretionary pol-
icy action enacted by governments, simply because there is no perfect way of
decomposing automatic and discretionary ￿scal changes. The risk is that any
statistical analysis based on this panel data set will lack statistical power. A
second way of proceeding is to focus on signi￿cant changes in discretionary
￿scal policy. This will ensure that our results are not driven unduly by cycli-
cal changes. An operational de￿nition of a signi￿cant positive ￿scal impulse,
i.e. a period of ￿scal consolidation is provided by Alesina and Perotti (1995)6:
De￿nition 1: A period of ￿scal consolidation is deemed to have occurred in
a given year if the discretionary general government ￿scal impulse is
greater than or equal to 1.5% of GDP.
4For a discussion, see Gramlich (1990), Bouthevillain and Quinet (1999), Bruni and
Tujula (1999) and Chalk (2002).
5Bruni and Tujula (1999) compare the Blanchard measure of ￿scal impulses with a
cyclical adjustment of the primary balance using the Hodrick-Prescott ￿lter. They ￿nd
that the Blanchard measure corresponds more closely to periods of expansionary or tight
￿scal stance as identi￿ed by economic commentators.It also has the merit of not relying
on problematic measures of potential output or base years.
6For similar subjective criteria see Giavazzi et al. (2000), von Hagen et al. (2001).
6This de￿nition allows us to identify a number of consolidation episodes
from the panel data. These episodes can be classi￿ed further into successful
or unsuccessful. To be more precise, we again follow previous studies on
￿scal consolidation (see Alesina and Perotti, 1995) in de￿ning a subjective
criterion for the success or failure of consolidation attempt, in terms of the
improvement of the general government ￿scal position7:
De￿nition 2: A ￿scal consolidation is deemed to be successful if, three
years after the consolidation attempt, the ratio of debt to GDP is at least 5
percentage points below the level observed immediately prior to the consoli-
dation attempt.
Having identi￿ed a number of periods of signi￿cant ￿scal consolidation,
we can analyse our data. As we shall see below, a useful approach is provided
by the methodology of event studies. Using de￿nition 1, we can identify 61
separate consolidation attempts. Of these, using de￿nition 2, 22 seem to
have been successful. Table 1 reports the countries and date for which we
have identi￿ed ￿scal consolidation attempts.
2.3 Event Studies of Fiscal Consolidations
2.3.1 Econometric Methodology
Event studies provide a method, based on regression analysis, to examine
the collective time pro￿le of key time series variables of interest around the
time of de￿ned events, in our case ￿scal consolidations. These studies are less
common in macroeconomics, but are more commonplace in ￿nance8. Here
we use event study analysis to compare and contrast changes in key ￿scal
variables before, during, and after a year of ￿scal consolidation, which is
the event of interest, with respect to ’normal’ or reference conditions, i.e.
non-consolidation years. By doing this, we can obtain a time pro￿le of all
the ￿scal variables of interest during the period of consolidation and periods
immediately prior and after the ￿scal impulse.
7In practice the results seem robust to di￿erent de￿nitions of ’success’, including the use
of a more re￿ned success index, as opposed to simply classifying attempts into ’successes’
and ’failures’.
8See for instance MacKinlay (1997) and Campbell et al. (1997). For instance, in
￿nance these methods are used to examine the impact of ’news’ on share prices such as
the announcement of pro￿t ￿gures, in the immediate and surrounding periods.
7In our analysis of ￿scal consolidations all the variables employed are ex-
pressed in percentages of GDP. We de￿ne an event window of ￿ve years, i.e.
two years prior the ￿scal consolidation, the event period itself, and the two
years following the consolidation. The width of the event window can, as we
shall see below, be altered if some of the time dummies used in the regression
analysis are not signi￿cant.
The econometric methods used are similar to those employed by Tornell
and Westermann (2002) in an analysis of business cycles around the time
of ￿nancial crises. Panel data methods are applied, where the panel regres-
sions include ￿xed e￿ects to account for cross-country heterogeneity and use
Weighted Least Squares (WLS) to account for the e￿ects of heteroscedastic-
ity. Each ￿scal variable in our data set is regressed over the entire sample
(for all countries, i, and all time periods, t) on a series of time dummies de-
signed to capture the time pro￿le of the variables. More precisely, the time
dummies capture the di￿erences between each period in the event window
and non-consolidation years. We carry out two sets of regressions.
First we examine all consolidation attempts collectively, where T denotes
the actual year of consolidation:
yit = ￿i + ￿1Di;T￿2 + ￿2Di;T￿1 + ￿3Di;T + ￿4Di;T+1 + ￿5Di;T+2 + ￿1i;t (1)
where yit is the ￿scal variable of interest in country i at period t, and
Di;T￿j are time dummies, equal to 1 in +j/-j periods from the consolidation
period, and zero in all other periods.
Second, we subdivide the identi￿ed ￿scal consolidations into the ’success-
ful’ and ’unsuccessful’ categories and perform the following regression:
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where again yit is the ￿scal variable of interest in country i at period
t, DS
i;T￿j are time dummies, equal to 1 in +j/-j periods from the success-
ful consolidation period (denoted t=T) and zero in all other periods, and
DU
i;T￿j are time dummies, equal to 1 in +j/-j periods from the unsuccessful
consolidation period (denoted t=V) and zero in all other periods.
8Each estimated coe￿cient (￿k;￿k;’k) captures the estimated di￿erence
between period k in the event window and the average position in non-
consolidation years. Thus, for instance, if the dependent variable is the
annual change in central government expenditure, a signi￿cantly negative ￿2
implies that in the year prior to the consolidation the change in central gov-
ernment expenditure was signi￿cantly lower than in non-consolidation years
(the ’normal’, or reference period).
As we shall see below, having estimated the standard event study regres-
sion it may be useful to see if individual countries or groups of countries
display signi￿cantly di￿erent behaviour from the rest of the countries in
the event sample. For instance, we might wish to consider whether those
countries with di￿erent types of government (e.g. coalition or single-party
governments) display di￿erent behaviour in terms of ￿scal adjustment at cen-
tral and sub-central level. Or we might want to consider if countries with
federal rather than unitary structures display a di￿erent adjustment pattern.
Equation (1) can be modi￿ed as follows, to include an interactive dummy
variable:
yit = ￿i + ￿1Di;T￿2 + ￿2Di;T￿1 + ￿3Di;T + ￿4Di;T+1 + ￿5Di;T+2 (3)
￿1ClDi;T￿2 + ￿2ClDi;T￿1 + ￿3ClDi;T + ￿4ClDi;T+1 + ￿5ClDi;T+2 + ￿3i;t
where Cl is a dummy variable which takes a value of unity in the case of
a particular country or group of countries and is equal to zero in all other
cases. The estimated coe￿cient on the interactive dummy variable captures
the additional e￿ect of this category of country over and above the standard
dummies. For instance, taking the previous example, if Cl is a dummy rep-
resenting the current Eurozone countries, a signi￿cantly negative ￿3 would
indicate that in the year of consolidation central government expenditure is
signi￿cantly lower than in non-Eurozone countries during ￿scal consolida-
tions.
2.3.2 Results
The results of this consolidation event study are presented as a series of
graphs, shown in Figure 1, panels A to V. As noted above, we consider all
the consolidations which fall into de￿nition 1, and then sub-divide them into
the categories of successful and unsuccessful, using de￿nition 2.
9The upper row of graphs in each panel shows the time pro￿le of the
￿scal impulse for, respectively, all consolidations, successful consolidations,
and unsuccessful consolidations. Alongside the ￿scal impulse we also plot
the standard error bands which show in which time periods the time pro￿le
implies a change in ￿scal impulse which is signi￿cantly di￿erent from zero.
The lower row of graphs in each panel shows the cumulative ￿scal impulse,
obtained by summing the ￿scal impulses over all periods. Again, for the
cumulative e￿ect we show asymptotic standard error bands. Panel A shows
the extent to which these consolidations involve an improvement in the ￿scal
position of the central government, as measured by the annual change in the
Blanchard ￿scal impulse. As can be seen from panel A, ￿scal consolidations
(as per their de￿nition), involve a ￿scal impulse which is at least 1.5% of
GDP in time period T. It is also interesting to note that the time pro￿le
of the consolidations around period T is very similar regardless of whether
the ￿scal consolidation is ultimately successful or not, but that as can be
seen from the cumulative graphs, the successful ￿scal consolidations involve
a larger cumulative positive ￿scal impulse, as the improvements at time T
are ampli￿ed in post-consolidation periods.
Panel B shows the ￿scal impulse by the sub-central tiers of government,
and shows how they fared during these ￿scal consolidations. What is in-
teresting is that the consolidation e￿ort is a shared one between tiers of
government. All period T dummies are positive and statistically signi￿cant,
suggesting a more favourable annual change in the discretionary ￿scal balance
than in non-consolidation years both within and outwith the event window9.
Interestingly, we see that there is a major di￿erence between successful and
unsuccessful consolidations: in the former, sub-central tiers of government
share a considerable part of the burden of macroeconomic adjustment. The
other point to note is that in the period following the discretionary ￿scal
tightening there is a partial reversal at sub-central level (the T+1 dummies
are signi￿cantly negative). This may indicate some resistance to the consol-
idation e￿ort.
Does a higher degree of ￿scal decentralization imply less control over ￿scal
policy at sub-central level? Rodden (2002) and Rodden and Wibbels (2003)
as well as Tanzi (2001), have argued that greater ￿scal decentralization might
9Note that the movement in the sub-central impulse will also be a￿ected by any change
in grants from central government.
10result in a potential deterioration in macroeconomic control, as sub-central
tiers of government have the incentive to myopically focus on local issues.
Whilst we do not attempt to answer this question directly, we do examine
the extent to which the most decentralized countries contribute to overall
consolidation attempts, and gauge whether there is evidence of greater resis-
tance to central government consolidation e￿orts within such countries. In
Figure 1, panel C we have divided the sample into countries with ’high’ and
’low’ degrees of ￿scal decentralisation. To be precise, we divide our set of
countries into these two categories on the basis of the percentage of expendi-
ture and revenue assignment at the sub-central level, with seven countries in
the ’high’ category10. Figure 1 (panel C) shows clearly that the ￿scal impulse
is larger in the ’highly decentralised’ countries at time T, involving an im-
provement relative to non-consolidation years of 0.5% of GDP). Thus, a high
degree of decentralisation does not seem to be inconsistent with sub-central
tiers of government sharing the burden of adjustment. As we shall see be-
low, concurrent cuts in central government grants appear to be an important
element behind this shared adjustment.
Having looked at the time pro￿le of the overall ￿scal positions, we now
examine the evolution of expenditures and revenues during the event window,
both their total values and their individual components. Note that in the
case of total expenditure we examine total primary expenditure excluding
transfers, i.e. excluding interest payments and transfers to other levels of
national government. Similarly total revenue includes all tax and non-tax
revenues but excludes grants received from other tiers of national government.
Intergovernmental grants and transfers are analysed separately.
Panels D and E in Figure 1 show the evolution of total expenditures in
central and sub-central government. Panels F-M show the equivalent plots
for the components of total expenditure (respectively wages, social transfer
10The countries were split into two groups along expenditure decentralisation lines, with
seven countries in the ’high’ category (Australia, Canada, Germany, Finland, Norway,
Sweden and the USA), and eight in the ’low’ category (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Spain,
France, the UK, Ireland, and the Netherlands). The results seem reasonably robust to
a classi￿cation along di￿erent lines, e.g. overall ￿scal decentralisation based on both
expenditure and revenue considerations. In addition, we also attempted to di￿erentiate
our sample along a related characteristic, i.e. whether the countries are federal or unitary.
In practice there is a substantial overlap between these two categorisations, and the results
for ’federal’ countries were similar to those for ’highly decentralised’ countries.
11payments, goods and services and capital expenditure). A number of points
can be noted from these results. First, as can be seen from panels D and E,
the key di￿erence between successful and unsuccessful consolidations is that
expenditure is tightened consistently over time during successful consolida-
tions, and not just in the period where the consolidation takes place (T).
This sustained cut is evident in the majority of the components of spending,
with the exception of central government capital expenditure which we dis-
cuss below. Furthermore, this progressive tightening is also evident at the
sub-central level, con￿rming the important role of the sub-central tier. Sec-
ond, it has been suggested by Alesina and Perotti (1997) that cuts in social
welfare spending and wages tend to distinguish successful consolidation, and
that this is linked to an important signalling e￿ect: by cutting these types of
expenditures central governments can indicate an important commitment to
￿scal control11. Panels F and H con￿rm this: while signi￿cant and sustained
cuts are made in the central government wage bill across both successful and
failed consolidations, the size of the cut is clearly larger, and the demon-
stration e￿ect stronger, in the successful case. Third, it is usually argued
(Alesina and Perotti 1995, 1997, and McDermott and Wescott, 1996) capital
expenditure cuts tend to be unsustainable and hence are more of a feature of
unsuccessful consolidations. Panels L and M show that capital expenditure
cuts by central governments do tend to be larger during unsuccessful consol-
idations, but that the picture is reversed at sub-central government. It does
appear that some of the pressure on sub-central governments is translated
into lower levels of public investment, and the di￿erence between successful
and unsuccessful consolidations is particularly marked.
Turning now to the revenues side, Panels N-S in Figure 1 show the evolu-
tion of central and sub-central government revenues and their components.
Panel N shows the point made in Alesina and Perotti (1995, 1997) that in
the year of the consolidation unsuccessful attempts are characterised by in-
creases in ￿scal revenues rather than expenditure cuts in period T. Note that
central government revenues rise in both successful and failed consolidation
attempts, but that the new higher level of revenues is almost completely re-
versed in the next year, with a signi￿cant negative e￿ect at T+1. Thus the
11Alesina and Perotti (1997) argue that outside of consolidation periods social transfers
and wages have the strongest tendency to automatically increase. This is supported by
the average ￿xed e￿ects in our estimated model, where for both wages and social trensfers
they tend to be positive.
12cumulative change in revenues pro￿le is not actually di￿erent for successful
and failed consolidation attempts. This is something which is not evident
from the Alesina-Perotti studies because they do not analyse the periods
subsequent to the consolidation attempts. Panel O shows that unsuccessful
attempts seem to be characterised more by an increase in sub-central govern-
ments’ revenues. Breaking down revenues into taxation and other charges
(including user charges), shown in panels P-S, one can see that although
there is a tendency for sub-central governments to raise taxation12 in the
period of the consolidation. There is also a tendency for user charges and
fees to be lower in the case of successful consolidations, although these ef-
fects are barely signi￿cant. We conclude that revenue adjustments appear to
contribute little to the cumulative pro￿le of ￿scal consolidations at central
or sub-central levels, and where present they appear to be more connected
with unsuccessful consolidations or to be temporary measures.
What seems to matter more, in terms of ￿scal consolidations, is the role
played by intergovernmental grants and transfers. Panel T shows the extent
to which central governments adjust sub-central grants around the time of
￿scal consolidations. It is important to note that all the countries in our
sample exhibit some degree of vertical imbalance in that expenditures at the
sub-central tier exceed own-source revenues with the di￿erence being ￿nanced
by central government grants13. Any changes in grants will therefore impact
heavily on sub-central governments.
The signi￿cant negative dummies in periods T, T+1, and T+2 in the
upper row of panel T shows that, relative to the reference category, grants to
sub-central governments are cut substantially both during and after years of
consolidation. It is also apparent that this result is driven almost entirely by
successful consolidations. The cumulative change in grants during successful
consolidations is about -1.3% of GDP, while the average change outside the
event window is 0.2%. In contrast during unsuccessful consolidations the
cumulative coe￿cient is insigni￿cantly di￿erent from the average ￿xed e￿ect.
Clearly cuts in grants are central to ￿scal consolidation e￿orts by central
governments: by cutting the ￿nance available to lower tiers of government
they in e￿ect force their hand. Below we will examine cuts in grants more
12Although it should be remembered that we do not distinguish here between taxation
increases where the base and yield is under the control of sub-central government and
increases in shared taxation revenues.
13See Figure 4.
13closely, to see whether, and when, sub-central governments respond to such
pressures by cutting expenditures, and when instead they choose to raise
taxes. For the moment, at least when we focus on ￿scal consolidations, there
would appear to be a reverse ’￿y-paper e￿ect’, in that cuts in grants lead to
cuts in sub-central expenditure. Again, we will return to this theme below to
see whether it applies more generally to all cases where central governments
cut grants to lower tiers of government.
Finally, we examine the extent to which the nature and stability of the
central government impacts on these ￿scal decisions. Using the data pro-
vided in Woldendorp et al. (2000), we di￿erentiate the identi￿ed consoli-
dation episodes along ’type of government’ lines. Although Woldendorp et
al. de￿ne six alternative forms of government, we group these into three
types: single party parliamentary majority, coalition parliamentary majority
and parliamentary minority with a single party or a coalition). The form
of government in the actual period of consolidation is used as the discrimi-
nating factor14. Panels U and V in Figure 1 show, respectively, the annual
change in government expenditures by single party and coalition central gov-
ernments, and the cuts in grants by these two categories of government. As
can be seen in panel U, there is only a slight di￿erence in the expenditure-
cutting behaviour of single-party and coalition governments. However, panel
V demonstrates that coalition governments are not able to cut sub-central
grants. All single-party dummies are signi￿cantly negative at the 10% level.
Cutting sub-central grants, like any other current expenditures is likely to
be politically di￿cult and strong governments may ￿nd it easier to deal with
the potential backlash from local government. The reluctance to address
sub-central ￿nances may partially explain the lower probability of success in
￿scal consolidations of coalition governments.
3 Cuts in Grants: How do Sub-Central Gov-
ernments React?
We saw in the previous section that central governments engaged in ￿scal
consolidations use grants to sub-central tiers of government as an important
14Potentially di￿erent types of government can be in power across our event window.
We ￿nd, however, that this happens rarely and does little to alter our results.
14instrument for controlling public ￿nances. We now broaden the horizon to
ask how these moves to cut grants impact on the adjustment decisions made
by lower tiers of governments. The reason for doing this is that ￿scal consol-
idations may not be typical of a more general tendency for di￿erent tiers of
governments to adjust ￿nancial ￿ows between them. For instance, in the pre-
vious section we saw that cuts in grants during ￿scal consolidations were not
characterised by increases in taxation, but instead led to cuts in sub-central
expenditures (including capital spending). In other words, ￿scal consolida-
tion seems to diminish ￿scal decentralisation. Is this a result which holds
more generally in a wider range of circumstances not formally de￿ned by
an attempt to restore the public ￿nances? Some writers have suggested for
instance that changes in grants between tiers of government may be used to
a￿ect the relationship between federal governments and states (see Quigley
and Rubinfeld, 1996).
3.1 A Cuts in Grants Event Study
In what follows we again employ an event study methodology in order to
study how sub-central governments react to cuts in grants. Changes in grants
as a percentage of total sub-central revenues now represent the ’event’, rather
than consolidation attempts. The variable in question is the change in grants
(at constant prices) as a percentage of the previous period’s total revenue (at
constant prices), i.e. ((Gt ￿Gt￿1)=TRt￿1)￿100. Here, unlike consolidations,
we focus on all cuts in grants in real terms, which provides us with a total
sample of 86 episodes. From these we exclude two, the UK in 1990/91, and
Spain in 1985/86, where the adjustments in grants were linked to a major
reform in local government ￿nance, and hence did not represent an attempt to
change the ￿scal balance between tiers of government without an associated
reform in local/state government ￿nance. A list of all the episodes which are
part of our sample is provided in Table 2.
As before, the basic event study regression is given as follows, where T
now denotes the actual year of the cut in grant:
yit = ￿i + ￿1Di;T￿2 + ￿2Di;T￿1 + ￿3Di;T + ￿4Di;T+1 + ￿5Di;T+2 + ￿1i;t (4)
where yit is the ￿scal variable of interest in country i at period t, and
15Di;T￿j are time dummies, equal to 1 in +j/-j periods from the period where
the cut takes place, and zero in all other periods. As before, we focus on
a variety of di￿erent variables: total expenditure, taxation, fees and user-
charges, the wage bill, social transfers, expenditure of goods and services,
and capital expenditure.
It is also informative to divide the events into two categories, de￿ned by
’large’ and ’small’ cuts in grants. These are de￿ned below. We then perform
the following event study regression:
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where again yit is the ￿scal variable of interest in country i at period t,
DS
i;T￿j are time dummies, equal to 1 in +j/-j periods from the period when
the small cut in grants took place (denoted t=T) and zero in all other periods,
and DL
i;T￿j are time dummies, equal to 1 in +j/-j periods from the period in
which the large cut in grants took place (denoted t=V) and zero in all other
periods.
As shown in (3), we can modify this regression to take account of partic-
ular individual or groups of countries to see if their behaviour deviates from
that of other countries in the sample.
3.2 Results from Cuts in Grants Study
3.2.1 Results
One issue is whether there is some non-linear e￿ect present which cannot be
captured by focusing on all real cuts in grants. For instance, it might be pos-
sible, given a certain degree of ￿scal autonomy for a sub-central government
to react to a small cut in grants by raising taxation, whilst a large cut could
not be accommodated in this way and might require a signi￿cant cutback in
spending. In order to check whether the results are a￿ected by the size of
the grant cut we divided our sample as shown in (5). We ranked our sample
of 86 observations by size and then divided them into two equal sub-samples
of ’large cuts’ and ’small cuts’. The largest cuts averaged 2.77% of total
sub-central government revenues, whilst the smallest cuts averaged 0.59%
16of total revenues. Note that both of these categories of cuts are generally
sustained. On average, the grants in period T+1 increased by only 0.1% of
total revenues for the large grants cut, and by 0.27% for small cuts. In other
words, large cuts are substantial and hardly reversed in the following period,
whilst small cuts on average tend to be partially, but not wholly, reversed.
As before, we plot the results from the event study regressions to show
how the ￿scal variables for the sub-central governments behave in proximity
of the cuts in grants event. These are shown in Figure 2, panels A-G. In
each row of the panels in Figure 2 we again plot both the annual change and
the cumulative change in each ￿scal variable. Panels A-G show the reaction
of each of the seven ￿scal variables to the cuts in grants during the event
window, and for each variables the results are divided into all cuts in grants,
small cuts in grants, and large cuts in grants. Unlike the ￿scal consolidations,
we ￿nd that for the cuts in grants regressions the T-2 dummies are always
insigni￿cant, and hence they have been dropped from our regressions.
A number of points emerge from Figure 2. First, it is apparent from
panel A that there is a sustained cut in total expenditures at sub-central
level, and there is even evidence that some of these cuts are anticipated as
the T-1 dummy variable is signi￿cant. This might be the result of planned or
signalled cuts by central governments. Second, as is apparent from panel B,
sub-central governments do tend to react signi￿cantly in period T to a cut in
grants, by raising taxation. Notice that, unlike the ￿scal consolidation study,
the estimated increase in sub-central tax revenue is signi￿cant at time T for
all grant cut episodes. The response of sub-central taxation revenues tends
to be immediate for large cuts in grants, and delayed (at T+1) for small cuts,
although the cumulative change is more sustained in response to small grant
cuts. This is a richer picture than emerged from our ￿scal consolidation
study, where there seemed to be little impact on revenues: although the
cumulative e￿ect here is not signi￿cant by T+2, there does appear to be a
shift towards sub-central taxation as a result of cuts in grants, with a delayed
e￿ect in the case of small cuts in grants. However, the impact is less than
that on expenditures, and in general this supports the notion that the ￿y-
paper e￿ect operates in both directions, in that local governments choose
not to fund certain expenditures if they have to provide funds from their
own taxes. This is generally supportive of the results in Gamkhar and Oates
(1996), and in contrast to Gramlich (1987). Similarly, there is little evidence
that non-taxation revenues from fees and user charges are used to o￿set the
17cuts in grants (panel C). Third, the impact of cuts in grants on the sub-
central government wage bill is signi￿cant at time T for all cuts, and there
is a signi￿cant (though small) reduction in social transfers and purchases of
goods and services (see panels D-F). In the case of the wage bill, the cut
in this following a large cut in grants is large and signi￿cant at time T and
T+1, but is very di￿erent in the case of small cuts, where the response of
the wage bill is barely signi￿cant at time T and never signi￿cantly below the
starting point, even at T+2. This might be due to the fact that large cuts
elicit major adjustments in sub-central governments such as adjustments in
the wage bill of local governments. Clearly in the case of social transfers any
e￿ect is small because the majority of social welfare expenditures are likely
to be the responsibility of central governments for most of the countries in
our sample, and this is similar across size of grant cut. Overall the major
impact of the cuts in grants appears to fall on the wage bill of sub-central
government, and this ties in with the evidence from our ￿scal consolidation
study, which suggested that sub-central governments play an important part
in stabilisations (see also Darby et al. 2004). Fourth, as in the case of
￿scal consolidations, cutting capital spending by sub-central governments is
a standard reaction. Panel G shows clearly that cuts in capital spending
constitute a large proportion of the overall adjustment, and that indeed the
T-1 dummy is signi￿cant, so that some cuts are brought forward ahead of
the cuts in grant. Overall the graph shows a substantial tightening across
the event window, and this is made even more signi￿cant by the fact that
capital expenditures tend to be only a small proportion of total expenditures
at the sub-central level. Table 3 shows that capital spending ranges from as
little as 6.24% of total spending on average in Canada, to 28.7% in France.
Small grant cuts account for more signi￿cant and sustained changes in capital
expenditure than large grant cuts, as in the latter case the cut in spending
appears temporary.
3.2.2 Dependence on Central Government Grants
One question which arises in analysing these responses to central government
grant cuts is whether there is a signi￿cant di￿erence in the responses of sub-
central governments which are highly dependent on grants and those depend
less on grants. In Table 4 we have divided the sample into a small group
18of ￿ve countries (the UK, Spain15 (post-1985), Belgium, Ireland and The
Netherlands) which exhibit a high degree of dependence on central grants
(above 50%) and those where the dependence is less (below 50%).
Figure 3 shows the annual change in the ￿scal variables following a cut
in central grants, in each of panels A-G. What is striking about these re-
sults is that those countries that are least dependent on central grants seem
to cut expenditure more (i.e. there is a stronger reverse ’￿ypaper e￿ect’).
From the results in Figure 3, panel B, it appears that ￿scal autonomy16 does
not necessarily imply a willingness to o￿set grant cuts through increases in
taxes. Similarly, those countries that are less dependent on grants are more
responsive in cutting all the components of spending (goods and services,
social transfers, wages, and capital expenditure).
This result does suggest that cuts in grants elicit di￿erent reactions in
di￿erent institutional settings, although it is interesting to note that those
countries that are least dependent on central government grants are more
likely to adjust. To check the robustness of this result, we conducted some
further analysis to check which countries and what institutional features were
driving this result.
3.2.3 Fiscal autonomy and Reaction to Grant Cuts
One way to examine how individual countries react during the events is by
introducing interactive dummies in our event study regressions (see 3). These
show whether individual countries display a behaviour which is signi￿cantly
di￿erent from that of other countries in terms of the coe￿cient on the time
dummies in the regression. To put this another way, it shows whether for
individual countries the pro￿le of the ￿scal variables evolves in a signi￿cantly
higher or lower path. In general, these results were not very informative,
and for some countries (Spain and Finland) there were too few observations
to allow us to introduce country dummies17. Some consistent results do
15Given that Spain underwent major reforms in the ￿nancing of sub-central governments
in the 1980s, we have divided the observations for Spain into two groups, those relating
to the pre-1985 reforms period, where Spanish sub-central governments depended less on
central grants, and the post-1985 period.
16Although one has to recall that many of those who are less dependent on grants do
bene￿t from tax-sharing arrangements.
17These results are not tabulated for reasons of space. However, the results are available
from the authors on demand.
19emerge: for instance, Belgium shows a lesser cut in expenditure relative
to the reference value, Canada and the US display a smaller increase in
taxation, and Austria and France showed a larger increase in taxation and
higher expenditure, following cuts in grants episodes. Germany and France
also displayed a signi￿cantly larger cuts in capital spending, but Austria
displayed signi￿cantly smaller cuts, following cuts in grants. In the UK sub-
central governments seem to anticipate cuts in grants with bigger cuts in
expenditure at T-1.
In order to obtain more informative results, which use up less degrees of
freedom, we tried grouping the countries into di￿erent categories, depending
on the institutional features of their ￿scal arrangements.
Table 5 shows the ranking of the countries in our samples by expenditure
decentralization. A greater degree of decentralization in spending should
presumably allow sub-central governments greater scope to adjust to a cut
in grants. The ￿rst row of Table 6 shows that this does seem to be the case,
with taxation, total expenditures, and expenditures on goods and services
lower than the reference value18.
We next attempted to see whether by grouping the countries by the de-
gree of taxation autonomy this might explain some of the reactions to the
cuts in grants. In order to do this, we use the measures of taxation auton-
omy published in OECD (1999) and Rodden (2002). There are, however, two
caveats with this. The ￿rst is that it results in the loss of observations for
two countries (France and Australia). The second is that the reference date
for these measures of tax autonomy (see Table 7) is ￿xed at 1995 levels. The
second row of Table 6 show that in fact few signi￿cant e￿ects could be found
at time T, so that tax autonomy does not appear to be a signi￿cant feature
explaining how sub-central governments react to cuts in grants. It is interest-
ing to know that a higher degree of taxation autonomy still involves a reverse
’￿ypaper e￿ect’ and that there is no attempt by sub-central governments to
o￿set the consequences of lower grants on sub-central spending.
Finally, we group the countries according to a measure of borrowing au-
tonomy (see Table 8). The ￿nal row of Table 6 shows that the countries
with the greatest borrowing autonomy react to cuts in grants through lower
18In tabulating these e￿ects we focus on the interactive dummies at time T. In some
cases, we found that the interactive dummies were signi￿cant in other time periods. How-
ever these e￿ects are di￿cult to explain in terms of institutional features in the country
groupings, and seem to be less important.
20total expenditure and lower capital spending, relative to the reference value.
It appears that, even for countries with high levels of autonomy, sub-central
expenditures and grants are strategic complements.
4 Conclusions
Our paper has established an important role for sub-central government in
￿scal adjustment. Using comparative data on sub-central government vari-
ables and on inter-governmental grants, we have provided a picture of how
sub-central tiers of government play a role during periods of ￿scal consoli-
dation, and how grants play a key role in forcing sub-central governments
to adjust. We use event study analysis to examine not only how govern-
ments react to these adjustment episodes, but also the time pro￿le of the
adjustment.
The results which emerge are varied and are set out in detail in the body
of the paper. However, it is worth highlighting three general points which
emerge from our empirical analysis. The ￿rst is that sub-central govern-
ments play a key role in successful ￿scal consolidations. This provides sup-
port for the argument that understanding sub-central government behaviour
is important in overall macroeconomic stabilisation. However, this result is
tempered by the observation that ￿scal decentralisation does not seem to
necessarily imply loss of control, as suggested by some observers (cf Rodden,
2002, Rodden and Wibbels, 2002), or to a higher degree of taxation. Sub-
central governments do not appear to react to ￿scal consolidation attempts
by increasing own taxes. Furthermore, the largest cuts in sub-central expen-
diture in response to a cut in grants from central government seem to have
occurred in countries with greater expenditure decentralization. This implies
that, even within countries which have high degrees of decentralization, grant
allocations provide a mechanism whereby central governments retain consid-
erable e￿ective control over aggregate sub-central expenditures. In future
work, we hope to focus more closely on the implications of alternative forms
of ￿scal decentralization on the nature and success of consolidation attempts.
The second general theme is that we present some evidence that cuts in
grants play an important role in ￿scal consolidations. We also demonstrate
that cuts in grants are not generally o￿set by increases in sub-central taxation
revenues. Overall, the increase in sub-central taxation following episodes of
21cuts in grants tend to be weak, and this is generally supportive of the presence
of a reverse ’￿y-paper’ e￿ect, but without evidence for an asymmetric ￿y-
paper e￿ect as suggested by Gramlich (1987).
The third general point is that capital spending is an important adjust-
ment mechanism for sub-central governments following ￿scal consolidations
or cuts in grants. Although the nature of the adjustment does depend on
the degree of success of the consolidation or the size of the cut in inter-
governmental grant, what is striking is that capital spending does tend to
su￿er at sub-central level following a ￿scal adjustment. This is despite the
relatively small size of capital expenditure compared to total sub-central bud-
gets, and possibly highlights a degree of short-termism on the part of local
governments in adjusting their ￿scal position.
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6 Appendix 1 - Data Descriptions
All variables unless stated are from the IMF GFS [2002] database.
1) Total expenditure = [All current expenditure (including wages and
salaries, employer contributions, other purchases of goods and services, sub-
sidies, transfers to households and transfers abroad) less interest repayments
less transfers to other tiers of national government] + [all capital expenditure
(including acquisition of ￿xed capital assets, purchases of stocks, purchases
of land and intangible assets and capital transfers) less capital transfers to
other tiers of national government.]
242) Total revenue = Tax revenue + non-tax revenue + capital revenue +
grants (total grants less grants received from other tiers of national govern-
ment).
3) Grants = Grants received from other tiers of national government.
Grants received from super-national authorities such as the EU are excluded.
4) Social Transfers = Transfers to households and non-pro￿t organisations
plus subsidies to ￿rms.
5) Government wage bill = Expenditure on wages and salaries.
6) Debt to GDP ratio = Gross national debt as a percentage of GDP;
source OECD Statistical Compendium 2002.
7) GDP = Gross Domestic Product (Expenditure approach) at current
prices; source OECD Statistical Compendium 2002.
8) Blanchard Fiscal Impulse = (Blanchard Adjusted cyclical balance)t
-Unadjusted Primary Balance)t￿1.
9) Type of government = Based on ’Type of Government’ variable in
Woldendorp et al. (2000). For each year, central government classi￿ed either
as single party majority (i.e. one party in government with a majority in
the legislature), coalition majority (i.e. two or more parties in government
where between the two they have a majority in the legislature), or minority
(i.e. single or multi-party government without a majority in the legislature).
10) Ideological colour of the government = Based on "Ideological Com-
plexion of Government and Parliament" in Woldendorp et al. (2000). For
each year, central government classi￿ed as Right-wing dominance (share of
seats in Government and supporting parties in Parliament larger than 66.6%),
Left-wing dominance (share of seats in Government and supporting parties
in Parliament larger than 66.6%), Centre dominance (all other cases)
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FIGURE 1: 
A: Central Government Fiscal Impulse 
 
B: Sub-Central Government Fiscal Impulse 































































































































































































































































































































   C: Sub-Central Fiscal Impulse split by level of decentralisation   
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  FIGURE 1 continued… 
D: Central Government Total Expenditure  E: Subcentral Government Total Expenditure 



































































































































































































































































































































































F: Central Government Wage Bill  G: Sub-Central Government Wage Bill 

















































































































































































































































































































































FIGURE 1 continued… 
H: Central Government Social Transfers 
 
I: Sub-Central Government Social Transfers 



































































































































































































































































































































































     Figure 1J: Central Government Expenditure on Goods and Services       Figure 1K: Sub-Central Government Expenditure on Goods and Services 



























































































































































































































































































































































 FIGURE 1 continued… 
L: Central Government Capital Expenditure 
      
M: Sub-Central Government Capital Expenditure  








































































































































































































































































































































































N: Central Government Total Revenue   O: Sub-Central Government Total Revenue  
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FIGURE 1 continued… 
P: Central Government Taxation Revenues 
 
Q: Sub-Central Government Taxation Revenues  



























































































































































































































































































































































































 R: Central Government Non-Tax Revenues   S: Sub-Central Government Non-Tax Revenues  
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FIGURE 1 continued… 
 
     T: Sub-Central Government Grants 





































































































































































U: Central Government Total Expenditure 
 
V: Sub-Central Government Non-Tax Revenues  
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 FIGURE 2 
A: Sub-Central Total Expenditure 
 
B: Sub-Central Taxation Revenue 


















































































































































































































































































































































  C: Sub-Central Non-Tax Revenues   D: Sub-Central Wage Bill 
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FIGURE 2 continued: 
E: Sub-Central Social Transfers 
 
F: Sub-Central Expenditure on Goods and Services 





















































































































































































































































































































































G: Sub-Central Capital Expenditure       
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FIGURE 3 
 A: Sub-Central Total Expenditure 
 
   B: Sub-Central Taxation Revenue 
 
   C: Sub-Central Non-Tax Revenues 







































































































































































































































































































































































D: Sub-Central Wage Bill     E: Sub-Central Social Transfers     F: Sub-Central Expenditure on Gds & Svs 







































































































































































































































































































































      x
 
FIGURE 3 continued:           FIGURE 4 
G: Sub-Central Capital Expenditure          Vertical Imbalances: 





















































































































































































































      Source: IMF Government Financial Statistics. 
                                  Figures are sample averages. 
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Table 1: Chronology of Fiscal Consolidation Attempts 
 
  Year of Attempted Consolidation  Successful Consolidations 
 
Australia  1982, 96 & 98   1996 & 98 
Austria 1984  None 
Belgium   1982, 85, 86 & 94   1994 
Canada   1982, 87, 95, 96 & 97   1996 & 97 
Denmark  1983, 84 & 86   1983 & 84 
Finland   1976, 81, 84, 88 & 93   None 
France   1987 & 97   None 
Germany   1976, 77 & 82   None 
Ireland   1976, 83, 84, 87, 88 & 89   1987, 88 & 89 
Netherlands   1983, 85, 88, 91 & 93   None 
Norway   1981, 83, 89, 90 & 94   1981 & 94 
Spain   1985, 86 & 97   1997 
Sweden  1981, 82, 83, 84, 87, 92, 94, 95 & 96   1984, 87 & 96 
UK   1976, 77, 87, 88, 96, 97 & 98   1976, 77, 87, 88, 97 & 98 
USA   None   None 
Total   61   22 
 
Table 2: Chronology of Grant Cuts 
  Year of cut in grants  
USA 1983 
UK  1977, 78, 79, 80, 82, 85, 88, 93, 95, 97 & 98 
Austria  1985 & 89 
Belgium  1981, 82, 87, 88, 89, 92, 96 & 97 
Denmark  1981, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 95, 96 & 97 
France  1984 & 96 
Germany  1976, 77, 81, 82, 83, 93,94,95,97 & 98 
Netherlands  1980, 84, 86, 87, 89, 93, 94 & 96 
Norway  1977, 93, 95 & 96 
Sweden  1978, 82, 83, 85, 86, 88, 91, 94, 95, 96 & 99 
Canada  1980, 84, 86, 88, 93, 95, 96 & 97 
Finland 1993 
Ireland  1984, 86, 88, 89 
Spain 1997 
Australia  1982, 86, 87, 88 89, 94 
Total 88 
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Table 3: Sub-Central Capital Expenditure 



















Table 4: Ranking by Dependence of Grants: 
(grants as % of total sub-central revenues) 
 
  Table 5: Ranking by Expenditure Decentralization 
(s-c expenditure as % of total govt. expenditure) 
 
Countries with Low Grant Dependence    Least Decentralized Countries 
Spain (pre-1985)  18.56    Belgium  11.82 
Sweden 21.59    Spain  (pre-1985)  15.74 
Germany 23.25    France  16.93 
Canada 26.00    Netherlands  24.99 
Austria 26.11    Ireland  25.27 
USA 29.53    UK  25.37 
Finland 32.19    Spain    (post-1985)  27.83 
France 37.14    Austria  30.73 
Norway 37.41    Most Decentralized Countries 
Australia 44.82    Norway  33.63 
Denmark 45.64    Sweden  36.19 
Countries with High Grant Dependence   Finland  38.86 
UK 55.74    Australia 41.43 
Spain (post 1985)  56.42    Germany  41.77 
Belgium 57.87    USA  44.51 
Ireland 69.77    Denmark  45.01 
Netherlands 77.41    Canada  57.34 
 
Source for Tables 3-5: calculated as sample averages from IMF Government Financial Statistics.    28
Table 6: Summary of results using country groupings 
 
Criteria used for grouping countries 
 
 
Significant NEGATIVE effects 
 
Highest expenditure decentralization  
Total Expenditure 
Expenditure on Goods and Services 
Taxation Revenue 
 










   
 
Table 7: Ranking by Tax Autonomy 
      
  s-c tax  revenues as % 
of total s-c revenues 
 
(A) 
% of s-c taxation for 
which s-c controls tax 
rate and/or tax base 
(B) 
Tax Autonomy: 
‘own taxes’ as % of total s-c 
revenues 
(C) = (A) x (B) /100 
                                                                                                        Countries with greatest tax autonomy 
Sweden 61.47  100  61.47 
Canada 56.41  86  48.51 
Finland 49.53  89  44.08 
Denmark 43.75  95  41.56 
USA 47.46  76  36.07 
                                                                                                         Countries with least tax autonomy    
Belgium 34.25  97  33.22 
Spain 40.71  67  27.28 
UK 24.15  100  24.15 
Ireland 10.25  100  10.25 
Netherlands 7.12  100  7.12 
Germany 54.45  13  7.08 
Austria 51.21  11  5.63 
Norway 45.74  3  1.37 
Australia 32.88  N.A.  N.A. 
France 43.06  N.A.  N.A. 
Sources: Column (A) - IMF Government Financial Statistics, calculated as sample averages. 
Column (B) - Estimates for Canada and USA were provided by Jonathan Rodden and are based on 
control of both the tax rate and base, the remaining data are OECD (1999). All figures are for 1995. 
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Table 8: Ranking by Borrowing Autonomy 





Norway   1.6 
Ireland 1.75 










Source: Rodden (2003) as adapted in Darby et al., (2003). 
 
 
 
 